⚪ A House Divided: The Fall of Leeds United Under Andrea Radrizzani
In the ever-volatile world of Premier League football, survival is not just about having quality players or scoring goals — it’s about decision-making. It’s about timing, foresight, and having a unified footballing philosophy from top to bottom. Nowhere was that more painfully illustrated than at Leeds United during the final season of Andrea Radrizzani’s tenure as owner.
What began with cautious optimism ended in relegation, and with it, the unraveling of a football project that once promised so much. From the dismissal of a cult hero manager to the last-gasp appointment of Sam Allardyce, Leeds stumbled from one mistake to another — trapped in a cycle of poor recruitment, indecision, and tactical incoherence.
This is the story of how it all went wrong.
🧱 Chapter One: The Bielsa Era Ends – And the Foundation Crumbles
When Marcelo Bielsa arrived at Leeds in 2018, he transformed the club’s identity. The Argentine’s demanding, high-octane football galvanized not just the players, but the entire city. Bielsa didn’t just get Leeds promoted; he made them believe again. He delivered an identity, a project, and a sense of belonging. His first season in the Premier League (2020–21) saw Leeds finish 9th, playing exhilarating football, and receiving praise across Europe for their courage and commitment.
But Bielsa’s system is relentless, physically and mentally. By early 2022, injuries were mounting, the squad was thinning, and results were nosediving. In February 2022, after a string of heavy defeats — including a 6-0 loss to Liverpool and 4-0 against Tottenham — Radrizzani made the brutal decision to sack Bielsa.
From a purely results-based perspective, it was understandable. But the bigger mistake was not the sacking — it was the lack of planning for what came next.
🔄 Chapter Two: Enter Jesse Marsch – A Mismatch from Day One
Replacing a manager like Bielsa requires nuance. The squad had been carefully molded for his specific demands — high pressing, man-marking, overlapping fullbacks, and total verticality. Any successor needed to at least share core footballing principles or be given time to rebuild.
Instead, Leeds appointed Jesse Marsch, an American coach whose style, while energetic, was rooted in the Red Bull philosophy — narrow formations, counter-pressing, and quick vertical transitions. It was a system with similarities on paper, but not in practice. Bielsa’s teams stretched the field; Marsch’s compressed it. Bielsa wanted his players to take risks; Marsch sought control in chaos.
Initially, Marsch did what was asked — he kept Leeds up in 2021–22, thanks to dramatic late wins over Norwich and Brentford. But those results masked deeper problems. The team’s performances were unconvincing. The defensive issues persisted, and attacking fluency was nowhere to be found.
Still, Radrizzani backed Marsch in the summer transfer window. Leeds spent over £100 million, largely on players from the Red Bull network:
Brenden Aaronson – promising but lightweight
Rasmus Kristensen – inconsistent
Tyler Adams – arguably the best of the bunch
Luis Sinisterra and Wilfried Gnonto – moments of brilliance, but erratic
The squad, while young and energetic, lacked balance and Premier League experience. It had depth in the wrong areas and glaring weaknesses in defence and leadership.
⚠️ Chapter Three: Warning Signs – And the Window That Slammed Shut
The 2022–23 season began with excitement: a win over Wolves and a stunning 3-0 demolition of Chelsea. But this was a mirage. Leeds quickly slipped into poor form, winning just two of their next 17 matches.
Yet the World Cup break in November 2022 offered a lifeline — a rare mid-season reset. Marsch had just overseen back-to-back wins over Liverpool and Bournemouth, but the performances were again chaotic. This was the ideal moment to change direction. The club had six weeks to prepare, rebuild, and enter January with a new identity.
But Radrizzani held firm. He kept Marsch on — and this may have been the single most critical error of the season.
Andrea Radrizzani (via The Mail): “We could have had Unai Emery or Julen Lopetegui but we missed that window. We tried with Arne Slot and Andoni Iraola after the World Cup but it was too late. It was my responsibility.”
The admission is staggering.
Unai Emery went to Aston Villa and led them from 16th to a top-seven finish and European qualification.
Julen Lopetegui joined Wolves and guided them to mid-table safety.
Leeds ended up missing both — not because of budget, but because of timing and hesitation.
🤯 Chapter Four: The Managerial Carousel
After limping through January and losing to Nottingham Forest, Marsch was finally sacked in February 2023. By then, Leeds had no plan in place and were forced to improvise.
They approached:
Andoni Iraola (Rayo Vallecano) – declined
Arne Slot (Feyenoord) – declined
Carlos Corberán – ex-Leeds assistant, stayed at West Brom
There was no clear succession plan. Eventually, they landed on Javi Gracia, a calm and professional figure, best known for his time at Watford.
Gracia’s appointment seemed like a relief. He picked up some points — beating Southampton, Wolves, and Nottingham Forest — but the style was conservative, reactive, and ultimately unsustainable. When Leeds fell to a 5-1 home defeat to Crystal Palace, followed by a 6-1 demolition by Liverpool, the writing was on the wall.
Gracia was dismissed in April — just 11 games into his tenure.
🧨 Chapter Five: Allardyce Arrives — Four Games Too Late
With four games left, Leeds turned to Sam Allardyce, the ultimate firefighter. But it was too late. The schedule was brutal:
Manchester City (L)
Newcastle (D)
West Ham (L)
Tottenham (L)
Allardyce couldn’t stop the slide. Leeds were relegated on the final day, finishing 19th, ending their three-year stay in the Premier League.
In those final weeks, Leeds looked like a team without belief, without leadership, and without an idea of how they wanted to play football.
💬 Chapter Six: The Aftermath – What Went Wrong?
Looking back, Leeds United’s collapse was not due to one bad decision. It was the accumulation of many small, avoidable ones:
- Appointing a manager (Marsch) with a clashing football philosophy to Bielsa’s squad
- Delaying the sacking of Marsch until February 2023
- Failing to secure top-quality replacements when they were available (Emery, Lopetegui)
- Recruiting players based on Marsch’s preferences, not long-term club needs
- Lack of leadership stability on and off the pitch
- Panic-hiring managers with no time to implement systems
Radrizzani later admitted his mistakes publicly, but the damage was done. The club was sold to 49ers Enterprises, who inherited a broken squad, shattered confidence, and the financial hit of relegation.
🧠 The Bigger Picture: What Can Other Clubs Learn?
Leeds United’s downfall offers a harsh lesson in Premier League survival and football governance.
Identity matters. You can’t shift tactics and recruitment strategies overnight. Continuity is key.
Timing is everything. The World Cup break was the opportunity. Emery and Lopetegui were available. Villa and Wolves seized the moment; Leeds hesitated.
Planning beats panic. From Marsch to Gracia to Allardyce, the club went from project-building to short-term survival mode in the space of 12 months.
Clarity at the top is non-negotiable. Radrizzani’s desire for European football was noble — but not grounded in the reality of Leeds’ squad, resources, or structure.
🏁 Final Chapter: From Bielsa to the Championship
Leeds United’s journey from promotion to relegation in three seasons should have been a cautionary tale of football’s cyclical nature — not a self-inflicted implosion. But misjudged appointments, poor timing, and boardroom hesitation dragged a once-proud project into the mud.
Andrea Radrizzani helped bring the club back to life in the late 2010s. But in his final year, he oversaw one of the most poorly managed seasons in the club’s modern history. That legacy, for better or worse, will always be a part of Leeds United’s story.
The road back to the Premier League will not be easy. But it begins with something Leeds sorely lacked in 2022–23: